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This paper discusses the recent palm oil expansion as a multiple crisis of climate change, biodi-
versity loss, and (failed) development. It draws on recent research on the Malaysian “Palm Oil 
Industrial Complex” and on transnational campaign coalitions around palm oil to explore the 
transnational dimensions of the palm oil crisis. It argues that a new campaign coalition around 
the issue of agrofuel policies in the European Union has emerged that links social and environ-
mental struggles in Indonesia and Europe. This new transnational activism not only rejects the 
palm oil development paradigm, but also points to possible alternative development futures.
Keywords: Palm Oil, Climate Change, Agrofuels, Transnational Activism, Indonesia & Malaysia 
Dieser Beitrag analysiert die gegenwärtige Palmölexpansion in Südostasien als multiple Krise von 
Klimawandel, Biodiversitätsverlust und (gescheiterter) Entwicklung. Forschungen zum malay-
sischen “Palmöl-industriellen Komplex” und zu transnationalen Kampagnenkoalitionen um das 
Thema Palmöl werden herangezogen, um die transnationalen Dimensionen der Palmölkrise zu 
skizzieren. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine neue Kampagnenkoalition gegen die Agrotreibstoff politik 
der Europäischen Union entsteht, die soziale und umweltbezogene Bewegungen in Indonesien mit 
europäischen Netzwerken verbindet. Diese transnationale Kampagne lehnt das Palmöl-Entwick-
lungsparadigma ab und zeigt mögliche Alternativen auf.
Schlagworte: Palmöl, Klimawandel, Agrotreibstoff e, transnationale Kampagnen, Indonesien & 
Malaysia 
1  Dr. Oliver Pye is a researcher at the Department of Oriental and Asian Studies, Bonn University, Germany. His re-
search focus is on globalization, social movements and socio-environmental relations in South-East Asia. Currently 
he works on transnational dimensions of the palm oil controversy and heads the DFG project “Entstehung sozialer 
Bewegungen im Kontext von Prekarisierung und Transnationalität in Südostasien”. Contact: oliver.pye@uni-bonn.de
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Introduction 
Over the last couple of years, palm oil has become a widely and controversially 
discussed topic in Europe. This is not so much because of the plant itself, which is 
actually quite useful, but because of the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations across 
South-East Asia which is seen as causing the destruction of rainforests (Buckland, 
2005; Goossens et al., 2006; Nellemann, Miles, Kaltenborn, Virtue, & Ahlenius, 2007), 
as well as a lot of social problems (Wakker, 2005; Marti, 2008). The really contentious 
issue, however, is the idea that burning palm oil for energy and for fuel can be part 
of the solution in combating global warming (Hoijer, Silvius, Wösten, & Page, 2006; 
Greenpeace, 2007).
In this paper, I will attempt to analyze these issues as a multiple crisis of capitalism, 
one in which the crisis of climate change is connected to that of biodiversity loss but 
also to a crisis of development. I am using the term crisis in the sense of a deep and 
prolonged problem of catastrophic proportion to which currently adopted answers 
provide no solution. The climate crisis, therefore, is the combination of the problem 
of global warming that is progressing towards a tipping point2 that could lead to rising 
sea levels, substantial changes in weather patterns, drought etc. (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007, pp. 44-54) with the fact that the rate of growth 
of global emissions (as the primary cause) has increased between 1995-2004 (IPCC, 
2007, p. 14), i.e. since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, which aimed to reduce emissions. Similarly, the 
biodiversity crisis is a combination of the extinction of species3, with the fact that the 
“threats to biodiversity are generally increasing” (Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity [SCBD], 2006, p. 3), despite the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) being in place for seventeen years. As I will argue below, although palm oil is 
promoted as a development strategy in South-East Asia, the current expansion is 
creating new poverty, leading to a development crisis in which the pursued model is 
undermining development. 
At the same time, I will try to analyze palm oil as a transnational crisis. I am 
2  Commonly associated with a Greenhouse Gas concentration of 450ppm of CO
2
-eq. (IPCC, 2007, p. 67).
3  For example, for South-East Asia, Sodhi and Brook (2006, p. 143) predict the loss of 24 to 63 percent of endemic 
species within the next century if current trends continue.
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using transnational not in the colloquial sense of global or international, but in the 
more specific sense developed by (among others) Basch, Schiller, & Szanton Blanc 
(1994), Castles (2004), Pries (2001; 2008) and Vertovec (1999; 2009). Rather than 
using the “national container state” (Pries, 2001, pp. 3-33) as the term of reference, 
the transnational approach looks at the reconfiguration of and changing relation 
between spatial, economic, social, cultural and political spaces in which transnational 
communities are “based in two or more countries and engage[d] in recurrent and 
significant transactions, which may be economic, political, social or cultural over 
long periods” (Castles, 2004, p. 25).
Accordingly, I will try to very briefly identify the transnational economic, social 
and political spaces that shape the palm oil crisis. 
Global Warming, EU Climate Policy and Agrofuels
At the heart of the multiple crisis is the failure of capitalism to deal seriously with 
climate change. In order to stabilize Greenhouse Gas (GHG) concentrations at 450 
ppm CO
2
-eq., an 80 percent reduction in global emissions will be necessary (IPCC, 
2007, p. 67). This requires a shift towards a low-carbon economy in the key sectors 
responsible for emissions (energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry), i.e. an 
end to fossil fuel use (responsible for 56 percent of emissions), a fundamental shift 
in agriculture and an end to deforestation. The necessary change is deepest in the 
industrialized North (particularly the USA and Europe) where per capita emissions 
stand at sixteen tonnes compared to four tonnes in the Global South (IPCC, 2007, p. 
37).
However, not only are the emission reduction targets (8 percent compared to 1990 
levels) set out in the Kyoto protocol wholly inadequate to even slow down global 
warming, the mechanisms adopted – in particular emissions trading and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) – ensure that the necessary break with the fossil fuel 
economy does not take place. As Lohmann (2006, pp. 101-136) conclusively argues, 
emissions trading, by awarding the largest emitters the most emission permits and by 
treating every emission cut as the same, “locks in” existing technologies rather than 
encouraging structural changes which would accelerate the shift away from fossil 
fuels. In addition, the offsets involved in CDM projects in the Global South prevents 
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changes in the North (instead of cutting emissions in the North, the projects cut 
emissions in the South), and, in many cases, contribute directly and indirectly to 
increased emissions (Lohmann, 2006, pp. 219-328).
Inaction on climate change is not a technical problem. Already, we have at our 
disposal the technology that could usher in a solar, low-carbon era. The energy from 
the sun “provides 15,000 times more energy a day than the earth consumes” (Scheer, 
2006, p. 1), and the potentially harnessed 1 percent of that would still provide six 
times the current level of energy consumption (Greenpeace & European Renewable 
Energy Council [EREC], 2007, p. 60). Leaving wind, wave and geothermal energy and 
autonomous photovoltaic units aside, areas as small as 11,000 km² (in Europe) and 
6,000 km² (in South-East Asia) covered with solar thermal power stations could be 
sufficient to provide all energy needed by these two regions (Greenpeace & EREC, 
2007, p. 63).
At issue are rather the specific “social relations of nature” (gesellschaftliche 
Naturverhältnisse) (Görg, 1999) involved in the way energy production is organized in 
late capitalism. On a fundamental level, the basic dynamics of capitalist production, 
i.e. the drive towards capital accumulation, market competition and the rate of 
profit, work against introducing solar energy. The amount of investment required 
means that – in competition with other energy sources such as coal – solar energy is 
more expensive and that the rate of return on investment is lower. Despite the huge 
future costs that societies will have to bear because of climate change, for a private 
energy company, it is still cheaper to dig up coal and burn it than to invest significant 
amounts in solar thermal power stations (Greenpeace & EREC, 2007, p. 33). 
In addition, the particular historical development of capitalism has led to fossil 
fuel industries dominating the commanding heights of industry. This leads to a 
concentration of capital and of political power in industrial conglomerates which 
have an inbuilt interest to resist a shift away from fossil fuels, as their business 
is in selling more oil, cars etc.4 This can also be seen by the way in which oil- and 
coal, automotive, energy and mining corporations form coalitions to prevent climate 
4  See for example Lohmann (2006, p. 121): „Major oil corporations such as BP and Shell, both enthusiastic initiators 
of internal trading schemes, have never voiced any serious intention to curb their main activities of oil exploration 
or production at any time. Although it has changed its name to ‘Beyond Petroleum’, BP committed itself in 2002 
to expand its oil and gas output by 5.5 percent per year over the succeeding five years. Its emissions in 2001 were 
equivalent to almost two years’ carbon dioxide emissions from the UK.“
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policies which could restrict future profits.5 In Germany, industry lobbying led to 
the (cost-free) allocation of emission permits of 44 million tonnes above the total 
emissions of the industries involved in the emissions trading scheme (Brunnengräber, 
2009, p. 410).
These interests are then reflected in the negotiating positions of national states 
within the climate negotiations of the UNFCCC and in their national policies. 
For example, Germany, although rhetorically in favour of measures to mitigate 
climate change, resisted attempts within the European Union (EU) to impose more 
restrictive emission targets for newly built cars and responded to the financial 
crisis by introducing the so called Abwrackprämie, which subsidises car-owners to 
trade-in their old car and buy a new one. A visionary and carbon-neutral transport 
strategy is something else, as the Abwrackprämie is not based on CO
2
 emission rates 
of cars. Rather than using the economic crisis and state investment to encourage 
the conversion of the automotive industry towards electric cars or public transport, 
the government is thereby “unnaturally” extending the lifeline of the car industry. 
The bottom line of climate change policies corresponds to the role as “national 
competition states” (Hirsch, 1995).
These three inter-related dynamics explain the emergence of the “biofuels 
agenda” in Europe leading us to the first transnational connection to South-East Asia. 
In December 2008, the European Parliament agreed upon a new Renewable Energy 
Directive (European Parliament, 2008), in which a mandatory target of 10 percent 
renewable energy for the transport sector was adopted. Although the definition of 
“renewable energy” has been broadened, most of the 10 percent target will be met 
by so-called “biofuels”6, i.e. petrol made from alcohol (i.e. from sugar cane or maize) 
or diesel made from vegetable oils (including palm oil). 
The agrofuel agenda was developed by a corporate-dominated commission that 
was initiated by the EU: the Biofuels Research Advisory Council (BIOCRAF). In 2006, 
BIOCRAF put forward a report which called for an expansion of “biofuels” to 25 
5  One example is the dominant influence of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN), a group of coal, oil, 
chemical, mining and automotive companies, on Australian climate change policy. The group gave itself the name 
“Greenhouse-Mafia” (Mazure, 2009).
6  The critics of biofuels, to whom I belong, use the term “agrofuels” which captures the large-scale industrial 
agriculture nature of petrol and diesel made from food crops better than the term “biofuels,” which has ecologically 
sustainable connotations that are unjustified. In this article, therefore, I use the term agrofuels, unless I am referring 
to statements by proponents of agrofuels, in which case I use biofuels in inverted commas. 
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percent of transport sector fuel by 2030. The commission (which has subsequently 
been reformed as the European Biofuels Technology Platform) was made up of three 
automotive companies (Peugeot, Volkswagen and Volvo), three oil companies (Neste 
Oil, Shell and Total), representatives of the biotechnology and food industries, and 
various associated research institutes (Corporate Europe Observatory [CEO], 2007). For 
these fossil fuel industries, agrofuels offer a way of reaching EU emission reduction 
targets whilst continuing with the same basic transport system (combustible engines, 
petrol, roads). Agrofuels are simply added to the 90 percent standard diesel or petrol, 
thereby ensuring that oil production, refineries, petrol stations, car manufacturing 
etc. can all remain in place. Rather than scaling down and ultimately breaking with 
the fossil fuel transport system, therefore, agrofuels contribute to expanding its life 
expectancy. 
Furthermore, the political creation of a huge and politically guaranteed market 
for agrofuels is having repercussions around the world, particularly in South-East 
Asia. The palm oil industry calculates that the 10 percent target could translate into 
a volume of nine million tonnes7 of “biofuels” which would need to be imported, and 
is keen to fill the gap with biodiesel from palm oil (Basiron, 2008a, p. 14). EU climate 
policy is thereby contributing to an unprecedented expansion of oil palm plantations 
across South-East Asia.
The Palm Oil Industrial Complex and the Double Environmental Crisis
Even before the advent of a “biofuels” market, the palm oil industry had seen 
enormous growth. In Malaysia, the area devoted to oil palm doubled during the pre-
1997 boom to nearly three million hectares. Since the economic crisis of 1997, the key 
area of expansion has been Sumatra and Kalimantan in Indonesia, with plantations 
expanding from 2.5 to nearly 6 million hectares in 2005. The prospect of agrofuel 
markets in the pre-2009-crisis years induced a frenzy of investment and mergers and 
to predictions of a further expansion of up to 25 million hectares for the region by 
2020 (Colchester et al., 2006, pp. 24-26).
The expansion of oil palm plantations is driven by two distinct groups of companies 
7   A considerable amount, when compared to a total Malaysian production of 17 million tonnes. 
86
ASEAS 2 (2) Oliver Pye - Palm Oil as a Transnational Crisis in South-East Asia
in Indonesia and in Malaysia, in which transnational corporations play a leading 
role. In Indonesia, these tend to be large-scale conglomerates which were formerly 
involved in logging as well as pulp and paper plantations, and for whom palm oil is a 
relatively simple continuation of the business of cutting down forests and replacing 
them with industrial tree plantations. For this reason, the Indonesian corporations 
tend to focus more on the “upstream” side of production, with plantations and palm 
oil mills, refineries and the production of Crude Palm Oil (CPO). 
Key Indonesian players include Astra, Sinar Mas, Raja Garuda Mas, Musim Mas, 
and the Salim Group/Indofood, many of which had close links with former Indonesian 
president Suharto and his family, leading one analyst to write of „palm oil nepotism“ 
and of „Suharto’s palm oil oligarchy“ (Aditjondro, 2001). According to Aditjondro 
(2001), these political-economic linkages also extended to Malaysian and Singaporean 
corporations who formed joint ventures with “companies controlled by four Suharto 
siblings, namely Bambang Trihatmodjo, Tommy Suharto, Titiek Prabowo, and Siti 
Hutami Adiningsih.” Ten years after the overthrow of Suharto, a similar oligarchy 
(minus the Suharto clan) controls the production and trade of palm oil through the 
state corporation PTPN I-XIII (the largest plantation company with over 600.000 
hectares of plantations) and private plantations.
After the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)-prescribed liberalisation of investment in the palm oil sector (Ginting, 2005), 
the transnational regional expansion of palm oil accelerated. A key role is played by 
Malaysian palm oil corporations. Casson (2000, pp. 41-43) lists 45 Malaysian investors 
who, together with their Indonesian partners, already controlled 1.3 million hectares 
– nearly half of the total area at that time – in 1998. Currently, the share of Malaysian 
companies in the Indonesian palm oil plantation area is estimated at between 30 and 
40 percent. 
Key Malaysian players are the state corporations Sime Darby and the Federal Land 
Development Agency (FELDA), and the private corporations IOI8, Kuala Lumpur Kepong 
Berhard and the Ganteng Group (Asiatic Development Berhad). The Malaysian palm 
oil corporations have a longer and slightly different history than their Indonesian 
counterparts. In contrast to Indonesia, the Malaysian industry emerged from the 
8  IOI derives its acronym from Industrial Oxygen Incorporated, when the company was founded as a distributor of 
industrial gas, but is now just known as IOI.
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colonial rubber plantation industry which was nationalized during the “New 
Economic Policy” of the late 1970s. They also tend to have a much deeper control of 
transnational production chains: apart from their regional investment in plantations 
in Indonesia (and more recently in Africa and Latin America) they also dominate 
“downstream” production, for example in oils and fats, oleochemicals and cosmetics.
The palm oil industry is a key plank in Malaysia’s development strategy and the 
influence of the state surpassed the kind of corrupt nepotism found in Indonesia. The 
state not only controls significant investment and some of the biggest companies 
directly, it has also actively intervened to forge a kind of “Palm Oil Industrial 
Complex,”9 linking state and private corporations, ministries and palm oil sector 
organizations in the national interest. Under the Ministry for Plantation Industries 
and Commodities, the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) not only regulates the 
industry, but it is also heavily involved in research and development with hundreds of 
scientists working on improved plant material, processing technology and pioneering 
work in the “biofuels” industry (Malaysian Palm Oil Board [MPOB], n.d.). Another key 
institution is the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC), which was set up in response 
“to a campaign against tropical oils in the USA in the 1980s” (Teoh, 2002, p. 106) in 
order to “promote the positive image of Malaysian palm oil in order to maximize 
returns to the Malaysian palm oil industry” (Malaysian Palm Oil Council [MPOC], 
2007, p. 2). The MPOC embodies the global reach of the Malaysian Palm Oil Industrial 
Complex (with offices in Beijing, Cairo, Chicago, Dhaka, Durban, Lahore, New Delhi, 
Sao Paulo and Vienna,) and the close nature of this “public-private-partnership”: 
board members include Haji Sabri Amad (the former chairman of Golden Hope), Carl 
Bek-Nielson (United Plantations) und Lew Yeow Chor (IOI Corporation) (MPOC, 2007, 
p. 6). Its chairman is Lee Oi Hian, the owner of Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad and one 
of the richest men in Malaysia.
Epitomizing the Palm Oil Industrial Complex is the recent merger of the three 
biggest state palm oil corporations – Golden Hope, Kumpulan Guthrie and Sime Darby 
– to form one of the two biggest palm oil corporations in the world. The merger was 
politically instigated and had the backing of the Ministry for Plantation Economics 
9  The term is an adaptation of President Eisenhower’s “military-industrial complex.” In his farewell address to the 
US nation in 1961, Eisenhower warned against “the grave implications” of the “conjunction of an immense military 
establishment and a large arms industry” whose “total influence (economic, political, even spiritual) is felt in every 
city, every state house and every office of the federal government”, arguing that “we must guard against unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex” (Eisenhower, 1961). 
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and Commodities and of the then Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who gave 
the key-note speech at the ceremony at which the new name of the company – Sime 
Darby – was revealed (Sime Darby Plantation, 2008, p. 3). The new Sime Darby has 
assets of around ten billion USD and produces around 6 percent of global palm oil. 
Over half of its 545,000 hectares of oil palm plantations are in Indonesia. It also owns 
the former Unilever oils and fats processing plant Unimills B.V in Holland and the 
oleochemical company Cognis. 
An important role in the emergence of a transnational palm oil industry is played 
by Singapore, which functions as a financial and trading hub for the sector. The 
Singapore-based corporation Wilmar is a good example. Wilmar was formed in 2007 
as a merger between the palm oil operations of the powerful Malaysian agribusiness 
Kuok Group, the Indonesian millionaire Martua Sitoris, and the US corporation Archer-
Daniels-Midland (ADM). Aside from its 570,000 hectares (the greater part of which 
are in Indonesia [Milieudefensie, Lembaga Gemawan, & KONTAK Rakyat Borneo, 2007, 
p. 15]) it can process around 10 million tonnes of crude palm oil in its 33 refineries. 
In the financial year 2007, Wilmar accounted for one quarter of global trade in crude 
palm oil (Wilmar International, 2008, p. 19). 
The symbiosis of economic and political power located within the Palm Oil Industrial 
Complex has important ramifications for the way in which palm oil expansion is 
conducted across the region. State and corporate interests are combined in such a 
way that environmental or social concerns are subjugated beneath a general strategy 
of development and accumulation linked to a continuous growth of the sector. So, 
although both Malaysia and Indonesia have ratified the CBD and the UNFCCC, the 
expansion of the palm oil sector usually overrides the goals of both conventions, 
exacerbating the double environmental crisis of climate change and biodiversity loss. 
The contribution of palm oil to global warming is primarily connected to the 
conversion of peatland forests. Peatland, which can reach a depth of up to 12 
metres in South-East Asia, is a huge carbon sink. When drained for conversion to 
plantations, peat is exposed to aerobic decomposition, and burning drained peatland 
can lead to smouldering fires that can last for days. An influential report by Wetlands 
International, Wageningen University and Delft Hydraulics (Hoijer et al., 2006, p. 29) 
estimated the total area of peatland in South-East Asia at over 20 million hectares 
and the total amount of carbon stored at 42,000 megatons. The report calculated 
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a total annual carbon emission rate from draining and burning peatlands of 2,000 
megatons, putting Indonesia “in 3rd place (after the USA and China) in the global 
CO2 emission ranking” (Hoijer et al., 2006, summary). Rather than reducing carbon 
emissions, agrofuels from palm oil therefore contribute to increased emissions. A 
recent report (Danielson et al., 2008, p. 353) calculated that it would take 75 to 93 
years for the emissions caused by converting rainforest into palm oil plantations 
to be compensated by avoided emissions from fossil fuels. In the case of peatland 
forest, this would take up to 600 years. 
In addition to contributing to climate change, the conversion of forests to palm 
oil plantations is worsening the biodiversity crisis. Despite claims by the Malaysian 
palm oil industry that oil palm is only established on former rubber and coconut 
plantations, much of the more recent expansion in Sabah and Sarawak has converted 
rainforests. According to a report by Friends of the Earth (2008, p. 29) on Sarawak, 
“the new area opened up for oil palm plantations in the 1990-2005 period (929,000 
ha) nearly matches the reported natural forest cover loss in Malaysia over the same 
period (913,000 ha).” The planned expansion of up to 15 million hectares of additional 
plantations in Indonesia will invariably take place by converting forestland. 
Even though much of this forestland has been logged and is degraded, the 
biodiversity implications are still tremendous. Research has shown that the 
conversion of formerly logged or degraded forest into oil palm plantations can 
lead to a reduction of bird and butterfly species by 60 to 80 percent (Danielsen & 
Heegaard, 1995; Wilcove, 2008). The impact of many and large plantations in changing 
the totality of a landscape and the resulting fragmentation of forests has even more 
severe effects on the long-term viability of populations of larger mammals such as 
the orang-utan (Buckland, 2005; Goossens et al., 2006; Nellemann et al., 2007). 
The transnational nature of the palm oil industry is often neglected, particularly in 
the discussion of the environmental consequences of the palm oil boom. This is evident 
in the way the recurring problem of forest fires and haze is framed. Although haze 
is seen as a transboundary problem this is understood as a regional or inter-national 
problem, i.e. the fires occur mainly in Indonesia but affect Malaysia and Singapore (e.g. 
Quadri, 2001). The role of transnational corporations is not acknowledged, with the 
result that mitigation efforts are expected from the national policies and measures of 
Indonesia (albeit with regional support), and this could be one reason why Indonesia 
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has not ratified the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution. The role of Malaysian and Singaporean companies 
in forest burning has been documented. For example, a recent police investigation 
into three Wilmar subsidiaries in Landak, West Kalimantan, found that they “were 
guilty of burning land intentionally and systematically with the intent to clear land 
for plantation development” (Milieudefensie, Lembaga Gemawan, & KONTAK Rakyat 
Borneo, 2007, p. 26). 
Palm Oil and the Development Crisis
The Malaysian Palm Oil Industrial Complex is particularly proactive in responding to 
environmental criticisms firstly by comparing palm oil with other oils (i.e. palm oil 
compares favourably with soy and rape seed because it has a longer life-span and is 
more productive) and secondly by asserting the right to development. At a recent 
conference on “sustainable palm oil,” the CEO of the Malaysian Palm Oil Council, Yusof 
Basiron, claimed that “attacks from overzealous NGOs on palm oil may damage the 
oil that has served the world to provide food oil and income for the poor in producer 
countries” (Basiron, 2008b, p. 10). At the same conference, S. Paramanthanan (2008), 
a retired official from the Ministry of Agriculture, argued that the development of 
peatland was necessary in order to eradicate rural poverty and to uplift the standard 
of living of indigenous peoples. The right to development is often framed in an anti-
colonial discourse. 
In contrast, many NGOs criticise oil palm plantations for worsening rural poverty, 
and agrofuels in particular have been linked to the food security crisis. In 2008, a 
World Bank report linked speculation around agrofuels to 75 percent of the increase 
in food prices (Mitchell, 2008, p. 17). In her detailed study of three Dayak communities 
in Central Kalimantan, Orth (2007) shows a significant reduction of food sovereignty 
for those villages in the vicinity of a recently established oil palm plantation.
The expansion of oil palm plantations is frequently accompanied by land conflicts. 
Small-scale farmer groups organized in the Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI) oppose large-
scale plantations because of food sovereignty issues. Indigenous groups organized 
in the Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) reject the further expansion of oil 
palm plantations because they encroach on their forestlands. In a recent conflict 
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in West Kalimantan, for example, one indigenous group issued a declaration which 
stated “the Semunying Jaya community call upon you to respect the sovereignty of 
our land, the protection of our water and forest resources as we inform you that we 
still refuse any oil palm plantation in our area, in whatever from or shape it may be” 
(Marti, 2008, p. 50). 
At the same time, many local communities accept oil palm plantations to their area 
because they hope that they will be able to generate a higher income as smallholders 
and because of the promise of new jobs. In theory, subsistence and forest-based 
livelihoods are exchanged for higher income through cash crop production and for 
salaried positions, and this is the development paradigm that is being offered by 
government and the palm oil industry. However, many of these expectations are 
not met. In 2006, smallholders formed a union called the Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit 
(SPKS) because of ongoing problems of indebtedness, low prices paid by the company 
and land issues (Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit [SPKS], 2006, pp. 16-17). Since the collapse 
of palm oil prices at the end of 2008 these problems have become more severe. 
As for the jobs created by the new industry, the low wages are not conducive to 
eradicating rural poverty but rather to cementing it. According to Marti (2008, p. 79), 
workers doing back-breaking work as harvesters or health-impairing work spraying 
herbicides usually earn the minimum wage or less, i.e. in 2006, 66 percent earned less 
than 400,000 Indonesian Rupiah or around 30 Euros a month. Although official wages 
in Malaysia are significantly higher at around 70 to 180 Euros a month (Malaysian 
Palm Oil Association [MPOA], 2005), official figures have been contradicted by the 
Indonesian Consulate, who claimed that Indonesian workers were often receiving 
less than two Euros a day (Marti, 2008, p. 83).
Indonesian plantation workers and their networks contribute to the formation 
of a transnational social space made up of migrant workers from (predominantly) 
Indonesia in the Malaysian plantations. Foreign workers now make up the bulk of the 
500,000 plantation workers (MPOA, 2005, pp. 16-17), because local Malaysians do not 
want to work there. The main reason is that although the wages are attractive from 
an Indonesian perspective, they hardly provide for a decent living wage in Malaysia. 
But low wages are not the only problem faced by the migrants. They have the 
status of “guest workers,” i.e. they are supposed to work for a period of three years 
(with an employer option to extend twice with a one-year contract) and then go 
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back home. Accordingly, they have no rights as a citizen, cannot organize, and are 
dependent on the employer who owns their work permit and who in some cases 
retains their passport as an additional measure to stop them “absconding” (Daud, 
2006, p. 46). The newly amended Immigration Act of 2002 prohibits family members 
from joining the workers, leading to intense loneliness. When workers do bring their 
families (often in quiet agreement with management who see this as a stabilizing 
influence) they now face the problem that their children are now prohibited from 
going to Malaysian schools.
It is ironic that the palm oil industry uses an anti-colonial rhetoric to justify a 
development strategy that was introduced by colonialists. Indeed, many practices 
in the industry today are reminiscent of colonial times, from the recruitment 
strategy of workers through agents (under the British, this used to be called the 
kangany system), to their temporary status and limited political rights through to the 
“primitive accumulation” involved in taking land – often by force – from indigenous 
peoples. Scepticism towards this kind of development strategy seems justified. 
Serge Marti, for example, who has conducted research into the labour conditions 
of plantation workers in Indonesia, asks “whether Indonesia’s policy-makers intend 
to keep a large labouring class in low-paid, low-skill jobs as the rest of the country 
develops, or whether the country anticipates inviting millions of workers from even 
less fortunate countries to work on their plantations in future” (Marti, 2008, p. 84).
A Crisis of Legitimacy
The double environmental crisis of climate change and biodiversity loss and 
the development crisis connected to palm oil have all given rise to various social 
movements and NGO campaigns. Because of the specific links between South-East 
Asia and Europe, economically along the global supply chains and politically because 
of the EU’s agrofuel policy, these activities occur in a transnational political space 
in which the palm oil controversy takes centre stage. Important protagonists in this 
transnational political debate are the Palm Oil Industrial Complex, large European 
end-users of palm oil such as Migros, Sainsburys and Unilever, large international 
environmental NGOs such as the WWF, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, the 
European Commission’s Directorate-Generals for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) 
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and for Environment (DG ENV), and a wide range of local and transnational activists 
from both South-East Asian and European countries. 
Two key transnational campaigns have emerged. The first was initiated by the larger 
environmental NGOs such as the WWF who used consumer awareness campaigns 
to put pressure on the larger brands and banks in Europe, who then negotiated 
with the palm oil suppliers in Malaysia to develop more sustainable management 
practices. The result was the foundation of the “Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil” 
(RSPO) in 2002 as a stakeholder initiative dedicated to propagating “sustainable palm 
oil.” As a stakeholder initiative, the RSPO was singularly successful in integrating 
a large part of the industry and a few NGOs around a set of principles and criteria 
embedded within the paradigms of sustainable development and corporate social and 
environmental sustainability. The criteria include the commitment to “zero-burning,” 
the conservation of “High-Conservation-Value Forest,” the respect of land rights and 
the right to union representation. 
However, lack of implementation of RSPO criteria and the fact that the RSPO 
supported the agrofuels agenda has undermined the legitimacy of the RSPO and 
given rise to a second campaign called the “Campaign Coalition for a Moratorium 
on Agrofuel Targets in the EU” (Econexus, 2007). Rather than targeting companies in 
the hope that they could become sustainable, the campaign focused on the political 
decision at the European level to set a mandatory target for agrofuels in order to stop 
a demand-driven further expansion of oil palm plantations. 
This new coalition is not led by NGOs but involves a large number of different 
social movements, networks and local initiatives. In South-East Asia, most of the 
local initiatives and struggles arise from the social issues connected to palm oil 
expansion, particularly land rights but also labour conditions etc. and are therefore 
mainly located in Indonesia. As mentioned above, local groups of indigenous peoples, 
small scale farmers and workers are organized in national federations, some of which 
are members of Transnational Social Movement Organizations (TSMOs, see Smith, 
1997, pp. 42-58) such as La Via Campesina and the International Union of Food Workers 
(IUF) which are important in the controversy surrounding palm oil. 
Despite the palm oil industry’s depiction of the environmental NGOs as a kind 
of neo-colonial (protectionist) intervention from the North, forest destruction 
and biodiversity loss are key concerns in South-East Asia, and the Indonesian 
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environmental network Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI) plays a central 
role in the transnational campaigning around palm oil. WALHI operates as a network 
of different local NGOs and activists but is at the same time a member of Friends 
of the Earth International, and has direct links with sister organizations in the 
Netherlands, Germany and the UK. 
On the European side, Friends of the Earth member organizations are also important, 
but there is a whole number of smaller forest NGOs such as the Brussels-based FERN, 
or the German Rettet den Regenwald involved as well. The environmentalists are joined 
by citizen initiatives such as the Bürgerinitiative „Kein Strom aus Palmöl!“ in Saarlouis-
Dillingen or the Arbeitskreis Heckenschutz in Lüchow Dannenberg, by various North-
South solidarity groups and by local chapters of the altermondialist network attac. 
The European groups were quite successful in influencing public opinion, with media 
coverage shifting against agrofuels within a two-year period10. However, although 
some of the modifications in the European Directive might be a result of campaigning 
work, the coalition did not manage to stop the 10 percent target.
Interestingly, however, the range of actors involved in the campaign brings together 
different paradigms, combining concerns over biodiversity loss and a critique of the 
fossil fuel economy with the demand for climate justice and food sovereignty. This 
has politicized the debate around palm oil beyond the single concern for the rainforest 
and orang-utans. Whereas the RSPO is firmly within the dominant paradigm of Global 
Environmental Governance, sustainable development, stakeholder initiatives and 
corporate responsibility, the new campaign coalition rejects it. Indeed, it has even 
given birth to a new declaration criticizing the RSPO for “greenwashing” the palm oil 
industry (“International Declaration,” 2008).
The key role played by environmental activists in WALHI and Friends of the 
Earth ensure that the forest issues are not framed in terms of conservation project 
management but within a frame that stresses social issues and human rights. The 
involvement of small-scale farmer organizations and La Via Campesina ensure that 
10  Media was particularly critical in the United Kingdom and in Germany. For example, German television aired a 
whole series of palmoil-critical films by Altemeier and Hornung in 2007 and 2008, including “Hier Bio - dort Tod: Vom 
Sterben des Orang Utans”, NDR, Phoenix; “Der Palmöl-Skandal - Wie Stromkunden Umweltvernichtung finanzieren”, 
BR Report München; “Der letzte Wald der Orang Utans”, ARD - W wie Wissen 2007, “Umweltsünde Biosprit”, ORF 
– Weltjournal; “Mogelpackung Biodiesel”, ARD – Monitor; “Ohne Rücksicht - Brandrodung für Biodiesel”, ARD- 
Tagesthemen 13.12.07; “Die Biosprit-Falle”, SWR-Auslandsreporter (see http://www.globalfilm.de). The negative 
publicity was seen as a serious threat by the Malaysian palm oil industry. For example, Errol Oh (2009) argued in 
the Malaysian tabloid Star, that “Fuelled by a cocktail of environmental issues, the anti-palm oil lobby in the West is 
gaining traction, and failure to counter this well can be costly.”
ASEAS 2 (2)
a perspective of food sovereignty (small-scale production for subsistence and local 
and regional markets rather than industrial production for a global market) is part 
of picture. Organizations involved in the globalization-critical movement such as 
attac bring their critique of corporate-led neoliberal globalization into the campaign. 
As these movements fuse together, they could lead to a crisis of legitimacy for the 
current model of action – or lack of it – regarding climate change. 
Conclusion
The palm oil boom in South-East Asia represents a multiple crisis, linking the crisis 
of climate change to that of biodiversity loss, of development, and ultimately, of 
legitimacy. This multiple crisis unfolds in South-East Asia through a number of 
transnational processes. Firstly, the rapid expansion of palm oil across the region is 
fuelled in part by European climate policy and particularly the role that agrofuels are 
hoped to play in reaching Kyoto and post-Kyoto emission reduction targets. Secondly, 
transnational corporations (TNCs) from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have 
created global supply chains that link plantations with refineries and manufacturing. 
These TNCs are driving the spatial expansion of palm oil in the region. Thirdly, migrant 
networks of Indonesian palm oil workers are creating a new transnational social space 
between Indonesia and Malaysia. And fourthly, the controversies surrounding the 
rapid expansion of palm oil plantations have given rise to a political space connecting 
South-East Asia to Europe in which transnational campaign alliances intervene.
These transnational linkages are important for an assessment of the controversy 
surrounding the palm oil boom. Rather than resulting from conflicting interests 
between nation states, with a contradiction between conservation goals of Europe 
versus development goals of South-East Asia, two transnational alliances have emerged 
which unite protagonists in both Europe and South-East Asia around opposite agendas. 
The first alliance, linking TNCs in Europe (i.e. BIOCRAF) and South-East Asia (i.e. the 
Palm Oil Industrial Complex) promotes palm oil based agrofuels as a solution to the 
crisis of climate change, and as a viable development model. The second alliance, 
linking civil society groups in both regions, sees agrofuels as exacerbating climate 
change and the related expansion of palm oil as underwriting a development model 
which undermines indigenous land rights and which is based on a low-wage flexible 
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labour regime. 
The renewed politicization of palm oil in connection with the agrofuel agenda 
shows that the attempt to incorporate criticism of the practice of palm oil production 
into a governance model based on corporate social and environmental responsibility 
– in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil – has failed to defuse the conflict. In 
the run-up to the Conference of Parties of the Climate Convention in Copenhagen, 
the transnational campaign alliances around palm oil are using the experience from 
South-East Asia to challenge the “false solutions” put forward by the European 
Union. In turn, this is contributing to the formation of a global movement around the 
paradigm of “climate justice” which links the double environmental crisis of climate 
change and biodiversity loss to the dominant development model of the North, and 
its repetition in the South. Alternatives being explored within this movement, around 
concepts such as food sovereignty, decentralized renewable energy, indigenous 
rights, negative growth etc. could provide a different and more viable solution to the 
multiple crisis represented by the current palm oil boom. 
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